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Maximum-likelihood estimates of a stochastic cost frontier function incorporating efficiency effects are obtained for 
twenty-two Australian building societies in the period 1992-1995. Cost inefficiency scores indicate that building 
societies’ costs were twenty percent above what could be considered necessary. The results also indicate that capital 
adequacy restrictions are not a significant influence on the level of inefficiency; though branch and agency networks, 
asset size, and non-core commercial activities are. At the industry level that there has been an improvement in the level 
of cost efficiency of Australian building societies during the period in question. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
At least four salient points characterise existing research into financial institution efficiency. First, 
all commentators concerned concede that in the financial services industry, the analysis of 
individual institutional efficiency is of paramount importance. For instance, the efficiency of an 
individual institution is intimately associated with the concepts of profitability and competitiveness, 
amongst others. However, the ability of these financial institutions to operate in an efficient manner 
affects not only their own condition, but also that of the economy in general; not least being the 
provision of quality financial intermediation, and the demands placed upon regulatory authorities 
and ultimately taxpayers (Berger et al., 1993, p. 221). Second, “...most of the research into the 
efficiency of financial institutions has focused on North American institutions...[and] in general, the 
motivation of this research has been to investigate the nature of economies of scale and scope” 
(Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1992, p. 1). In this regard, “relatively little attention has been paid to 
measuring what appears to be a much more important source of efficiency differences - X-
inefficiencies, or deviations from the efficient frontier” (Berger et al., 1993, p. 222). Even when 
such avenues of investigation have been pursued, few studies have attempted to relate financial 
institutions’ X-efficiency to possible determinants such as; agency problems; regulation, 
organisational and legal structures; and the scale and scope of operations (Berger et al., 1993). 
Third, the efficiency of thrift institutions, like building societies and credits unions, has not been 
studied extensively to date [for exceptions, see Hardwick, 1989, 1990; Field, 1990; Drake and 
Weyman-Jones, 1992, 1996; Piesse and Townsend, 1995, in the UK, and Esho and Sharpe, 1994, 
1996; and Worthington, 1996a, 1996b, in Australia]. Whilst commercial banks remain the major 
financial institution sector, the concentration of thrift institutions in areas such as consumer banking 
and property finance demands some attention (Berger et al., 1993). Finally, econometric techniques 
employed in all areas have in the main failed to recognise the competitive and institutional realities 
facing multi-product financial institutions, especially since the 1980s wave of financial deregulation 
(Hardwick, 1990; Piesse and Townsend, 1995). It is with these considerations in mind, that the 
present study has been framed. 
The use of Australian building societies to address these issues is appropriate for a number of 
reasons. First, since the 1980s the fortunes of the building society industry have directly reflected 
the changing regulatory environment in Australia. In particular, as the competitive restrictions on 
the federally-regulated banks were relaxed - opening hours, interest rates on deposits, percentage 
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valuation on loans, etc. - the state-regulated building societies once sound niche market has been 
progressively eroded. Accordingly, by a process of merger and acquisition, and the procurement of 
banking licenses, the building society sector is now characterised by large regionally-based 
institutions.1 The extent to which these modifications in the institutional and competitive 
environment have affected the efficiency of those institutions which remain, either willingly or 
unwillingly, is as yet unquantified. Second, unlike credit unions, which have achieved a high degree 
of interstate and industry-wide cooperation and integration, building societies have apparently 
failed to capitalise on the opportunities presented by changes in the fee structure of the major 
commercial banks.2 A similar line holds for the highly diversified property finance market. 
However, despite this, building societies still account for some six to seven percent by value of all 
housing finance, both construction and purchase. The issue thus arises as to whether technical 
efficiency is, at least a contributory factor in this scenario. Third, an adequate amount of statistical 
information is an obvious sine qua non for estimations of this type. Fortunately sets of extensive, 
comparable and consistent data exist for building societies; a requirement that is somewhat less 
likely to hold for Australian commercial banks for instance. Finally, there is some degree of 
correspondence between the situation facing Australian building societies and the decline of the US 
savings and loans (S&Ls) industry. In the latter’s case, “the most often cited factors contributing to 
this downfall have been interest rate risk, deregulation, and the economic decline of specific 
geographic markets [and] more recently, the possibility of X-inefficiency in the use of inputs and 
outputs has been offered” (Berger et al., 1993). These same factors are also found in the Australian 
financial services industry; along with building society-specific efficiency concerns such as 
speculative commercial property lending, inadequate capitalisation, and over-branching (Esho and 
Sharpe, 1996, p. 247).3 
The paper itself is divided into four main areas. Section 2 provides a synopsis of the econometric 
techniques employed in evaluating financial institution efficiency. Section 3 deals with the 
empirical methodology employed in the current paper, and the results are discussed in Section 4. 
The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks in Section 5. 
II. THE ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT 
The recent history of efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957) who defined a simple 
measure of firm efficiency which could account for multiple inputs. In this approach, Farrell (1957) 
proposed that the efficiency of any given firm consisted of two components: technical efficiency, or 
the ability of a firm to maximise output from a given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, or the 
ability of a firm to use these inputs in optimal proportions, given the respective prices. Combining 
the two measures provides a measure of total or economic efficiency. 
The essence of Farrell’s (1957) argument may be derived from Figure 1. Here two inputs, x1 and x2 
are utilised to produce a single output y, under an assumption of constant returns to scale. The 
isoquant of the fully efficient firm SS' permits the measurement of technical efficiency. For a given 
firm using quantities of inputs defined by point P, to produce a unit of output, the level of technical 
efficiency may be defined as the ratio OQ/OP, which is the proportional reduction in all inputs that 
 
1 Indeed, from 1978 to 1990 the number of individual societies fell from 153 to 52: even the in period 1993-1995, the 
number of individual societies fell from 39 to 28.  
2 The 1995 Prices Surveillance Authority inquiry into banking charges freed up the ability of financial institutions to 
charge account-keeping and transaction fees. At the height of bank customer dissatisfaction, many credit unions 
reported a 55 percent increase in the growth of new accounts (though at least 20 percent of these were costly “high 
transaction/low balance” accounts). On the other hand, building societies have more readily adopted a fee structure 
similar to that of the major commercial banks.  
3 “Non-Bank Financial Institutions: A Special Report” [The Australian Financial Review, Thursday 20 June 1996, 42–
50] provides an up-to-date analysis. 
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could be theoretical achieved without any reduction in output. Point Q on the other hand is 
technically efficient since it already lies on the efficient isoquant. Extending the model when the 
input price ratio AA' is known, then allocative efficiency at point P is the ratio OR/OQ, where the 
distance RQ is the reduction in production costs which would occur if production occurred at Q' - 
the allocatively and technically efficient point, rather than Q - the technically efficient, but 
allocatively inefficient point. Hence, the total economic efficiency is the ratio OR/OP, with the cost 
reduction achievable being the distance RP.  
It is Farrell’s (1957) suggestion that inefficiency could be measured in terms of realised deviations 
from an idealised, frontier isoquant that provides the basis for the current empirical analysis: that is, 
inefficiency may be readily identified with disturbances in an econometric model (Greene, 1993, p. 
68). Attempts to estimate the efficient isoquant under a number of alternative assumptions are the 
subject of significant and protracted debate; certainly to the point of precluding a review in this 
instance. Suitable surveys are to be found in Førsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980), Seiford and 
Thrall (1990), Greene (1993), Lovell (1993), Bauer et al., (1993), and Ali and Seiford (1993). 
Figure 1. Technical and Allocative Efficiencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the many approaches employed in the past, one consistently popular methodology has been the 
stochastic frontier function (see Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 
1977; Battese and Corra, 1977). In the case of a production approach, the stochastic frontier 
methodology posits that the realised production of a firm is bounded from above by the sum of (i) a 
parametric function of known inputs, involving unknown parameters, and (ii) a random error, 
associated with either misspecification in the model or uncontrollable factors (such as equipment 
failures, weather, etc.) It is the appropriate recognition of the later that characterises the stochastic 
frontier methodology, and provides the basis for a two-component error structure: one component 
represents random, uncontrollable factors, whilst the second measures the individual firm deviation 
due to factors within a manager’s control, such as technical and allocative efficiency. In addition, 
the methodology may also be easily extended to alternative representations of the technology, such 
as a cost or profit function. In the case of the former, errors in production decisions will necessarily 
translate into costs of production higher than those theoretically obtainable, whilst for the later these 
same errors will imply lower profits. 
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In terms of the specific estimation technique which follows, a stochastic cost frontier using panel 
data and incorporating efficiency effects is formulated, following Battese and Coelli (1993). The 
most notable features of this model are: (i) a stochastic cost frontier approach, (ii) the use of panel, 
or pooled time-series, cross-sectional data, and (iii) the single-stage estimation of both the cost 
frontier and the coefficients of firm-specific variables that identify the sources of cost inefficiency. 
In the first instance, an alternative dual form - such as a cost or profit function - of the production 
technology is to be preferred for at least two reasons. First, more often than not the explicit 
assumption of the production function approach that input levels are fixed, and that managerial 
inputs are attempting to maximise output, will not hold. In particular, one would expect that for a 
financial institution, such as a building society, the imposition of capital adequacy requirements 
would tend to restrict the amount of output possible in any one time period. Hence, a suitable 
behavioural objective for these institutions would be that of cost minimisation, rather than output 
maximisation. Second, building societies are multiple-output concerns, encompassing both loans 
(consumer, property, commercial) and investment in financial assets (cash, governmental securities, 
bank bills and negotiable certificates of deposit). The argument for a cost function is enhanced a 
fortiori, given the necessity of integrating multiple financial outputs (Cebenoyan et al., 1993; 
Mester, 1987, 1993; McKillop and Glass, 1994; Piesse and Townsend, 1995).4  
In the second instance, panel (or pooled time-series, cross-sectional) techniques offer a number of 
advantages over traditional cross-sectional estimations. Not least amongst these is: the ability to 
increase the degrees of freedom for parameter estimations; the provision of consistent estimators of 
firm efficiencies; the removal of the necessity to make particular assumptions about the behaviour 
of cost efficiencies, and the ability to simultaneously investigate the impact of technical change and 
technical efficiency over time (Coelli, 1995, p. 8). In the case of building societies, the small 
number of institutions, and the relative importance of technological advances in the industry, point 
to the use of this data form (Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles, 1990; Atkinson and Cornwell, 1993). 
Finally, not content with merely estimating firm-level efficiencies, many studies have attempted to 
identify the sources of said inefficiencies. More often than not, this has involved regressing the 
predicted inefficiencies on firm-specific variables, such as managerial inputs, agency issues, and 
financial structure (Cebenoyan et al., 1993; Mester, 1993). However, it has been argued that the 
method of parameter estimation used in the second-stage inefficiency model is based on 
assumptions clearly inconsistent with those found in the estimation of the stochastic frontier. For 
example, most studies assume that the firm-specific effects are independently distributed in the 
first-stage estimation, yet regress the predicted inefficiencies on firm-specific factors in the second 
stage. This problem is addressed by several studies which consider a stochastic frontier in which the 
non-negative inefficiency effects are a linear function of firm-specific characteristics. The additive 
random error of the inefficiency model is assumed to be a truncation of a normal distribution with 
mode zero, with the point of truncation being dependent on firm characteristics [Battese and Coelli 
(1993) provide a survey of recent work in this area]. Battese and Coelli (1993) extend this approach 
to allow for panel data, expressing the explanatory variables in the inefficiency model as an explicit 
function of the vector of firm-specific variables and time effects, and the explanatory variables of 
the stochastic frontier - all relevant parameters are estimated simultaneously. 
The stochastic cost frontier is defined: 
 TCit = Xitβ + εit i = 1,....,N and t = 1,....,T.       (1) 
 
4 The cost approach implies that any errors in optimisation, technical or allocative, must appear as higher costs. 
Therefore, any results obtained should be interpreted as cost inefficiencies (the sum of technical and allocative 
inefficiency). 
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where TCit is the logarithm of the total cost of production of the i-th firm in the t-th time period; Xit 
is a (k×1) vector of input prices P and output Q, β is a vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated, and εit is a disturbance term where: 
  εit = (Vit + Uit)  i = 1,....,N and t = 1,....,T. (2) 
As per the earlier discussion, the disturbance is composed of two influences: Vit are random 
variables assumed to be iid N(0,σv2) and independent of Uit, which are non-negative random 
variables assumed to account for the cost of inefficiency in production. The later are assumed to be 
independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N(mit, σU2) distribution; where mit = zitδ is a 
(p×1) vector of variables Z which influence the efficiency of a firm; and δ is an (1×p) vector of 
parameters to be estimated. 
The error term is decomposed using the conditional distribution approach proposed by Jondrow et 
al. (1982) for a truncated normal distribution; providing an unbiased, though inconsistent, estimate 
of the cost of inefficiency. The measure of cost inefficiency relative to the cost frontier is defined 
as: 
 E[U|ε] = [σλ/(1+λ2)][φ(μ*/σ)/Φ(μ*/σ) + μ*/σ]  (3) 
where σ = σV2 + σU2, λ = σU2/(σV2 + σU2), μ* = ελ/σ + μ/(σλ), φ is the standard normal density 
function, and Φ the cumulative normal density function, and all other terms are as previously 
defined [further details are presented in the Appendix, Battese and Coelli (1993)]. To obtain 
estimates of (3), maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the stochastic cost frontier (1) 
are first estimated. Two further a priori specifications are therefore required. These are: (i) the 
selection of a suitable cost function, and (ii) the identification of the vectors of variables. These are 
detailed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
3.2 Cost function formulation 
The Cobb-Douglas and translog (transcendental logarithmic) are the two most commonly used cost 
functions employed in stochastic frontier analyses. Following Cebenoyan, et al. (1993) and Esho 
and Sharpe (1996) for an X-efficiency analysis, and Mester (1993), McKillop and Glass (1994) and 
Esho and Sharpe (1994) for scale and scope analyses, a translog cost function is employed. The 
advantages of this formulation are twofold. First, the translog places no a priori restrictions on the 
elasticity of substitution between inputs, and second, economies of scale are not restricted to take 
the same value across all firms. However, the translog does suffer a number of deficiencies. Esho 
and Sharpe (1994, p. 261) observe that most of these relate to the estimation of economies of scope 
and scale. However, problems with the large number of parameters to be estimated also applies to 
cost efficiency estimates. In part, this issue is resolved by the use of panel data, but it also serves to 
highlight concerns that might appear if the same procedure is employed with, say, a cross-section of 
Australian banks. Accordingly, to estimate the cost function in equation (1), the following translog 
cost formulation is specified:  
 lnTC = α0 + ΣilnQi + ΣjβjlnPj + ½ΣiΣkδiklnQilnQk + ½ΣjΣhγjhlnPjlnPh + ΣiΣjρijlnQilnPj  (4) 
for i,k = 1, . . . , a and j, h = 1, . . . , p where TC = total operating and interest costs, Pj = unit price 
of factor input j, and Qi = quantity of output i. Equation (3) is then reformulated to impose the 
standard symmetry and linear input price homogeneity restrictions, following Cebenoyan, et al., 
(1993) and Esho and Sharpe (1994). The reformulated translog cost function is: 
 lnTC* = α0 + ΣilnQi + ΣjβjlnPj* + ½ΣiΣkδiklnQilnQk + ½ΣjΣhγjhlnPj*lnPh* + ΣiΣjρijlnQilnPj*
 (5) where i,k = 1, . . . , a and j, h = 1, . . . , p - 1, and TC* = TC/Pp, Pj* = Pj/Pp, and Ph* = 
Ph/Pp. 
3.3 Variable specification 
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Quarterly data for twenty-two continuously operating building societies in the period September 
1992 to September 1995 is obtained from the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC).  
Primarily in the form of quarterly profit and loss (income) statements and balance sheets, this 
information provides all inputs for the necessary calculations.  
TABLE 1. Cost function and explanatory variables 
The variables selected follow the intermediation approach to financial institution operations 
(Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1990; Hardwick, 1990; Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1992; Cebenoyan et al., 
1993; Piesse and Townsend, 1995).5 Under this approach, a financial institution, in this case, a 
building society, “...uses physical capital, deposits and other borrowings, and labour as inputs to 
produce earning assets as outputs” (Cebenoyan et al., 1993, p. 157). Given the model detailed 
above, building societies are thus characterised as incurring operating and interest costs (TC), whilst 
producing four categories of output (Q), using three input prices (P), and operating under six 
 
5 In the alternative production approach, financial institutions utilise capital and labour inputs to produce the outputs of 
loans and deposit accounts. Outputs are measured by the number of deposit and loan accounts, and costs include 
operating expenses, but exclude interest. The intermediation approach is preferred on the basis that it; (i) incorporates 
all expenses (of which interest expenses are generally the most significant), and (ii) recognises that deposits are more 
accurately inputs into financial intermediation, rather than outputs (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1990, p. 543). 
TC Total cost Operating + interest expenses of the i-th building society in the t-th time 
period. 
Q1 Personal 
loans 
Personal loans and consumer credit facilities held by the i-th building 
society in the t-th time period. 
Q2 Property 
loans 
Property and real estate loans held by the i-th building society in the t-th 
time period. 
Q3 Commercial 
loans 
Commercial loans held by the i-th building society in the t-th time period. 
Q4 Other 
securities 
Governmental securities, BBs and NCDs, deposits with other building 
societies and banks, held by the i-th building society in the t-th time 
period. 
P1 Price of 
physical 
capital 
Sum of physical capital expenditures (office and equipment expenses, etc.) 
divided by the book value of net total office premises and equipment 
(including office buildings and land, leasehold improvements, furniture 
and fixtures, capitalised leases) the i-th building society in the t-th time 
period. 
P2 Price of 
deposits 
Total interest expense divided by total deposits and other borrowings for 
the i-th building society in the t-th time period.. 
P3 Price of 
labour 
Total expenditures on employees divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent employees for the i-th building society in the t-th time period. 
Z1 Assets Total financial and nonfinancial assets of the i-th building society in the t-
th time period. 
Z2 Capital Total capital divided by total assets of the i-th building society in the t-th 
time period. 
Z3 Branches Number of branches operated by the i-th building society in the t-th time 
period. 
Z4 Agencies Number of agencies operated by the i-th building society in the t-th time 
period. 
Z5 Time Time trend 
Z6 Commercial Total commercial loans held divided by total assets of the i-th building 
society in the t-th time period. 
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selected explanatory variables (Z).6 The incorporation of the first three categories of variables 
closely follows Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992; 1996), Cebenoyan et al. (1993), and Piesse and 
Townsend (1995). Sample descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics 
As at financial year ending 30 June 1995.  
The six explanatory variables are included to identify sources of cost inefficiency in Australian 
building societies. The first variable, total assets, is intended to control for the overall size of a 
building society (Hardwick, 1990; Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1992; Mester, 1993). It may be 
argued that larger building societies direct more managerial inputs into identifying and resolving 
inefficiency; ex ante one would expect a negative coefficient when cost inefficiency is regressed 
against total assets. The second explanatory variable included is the firm’s capital to asset ratio. All 
other things being equal, “moral hazard theory suggests [the capital asset ratio]  should be inversely 
related to inefficiency” (Mester, 1993, p. 282). The number of branches and agencies of each 
building society are also included, generating two somewhat conflicting hypotheses. The first is that 
under the intermediation approach, branches and agencies are recognised as “...central to the 
intermediation process for most building societies, it may also be the case that differences in the 
intensity of branching may be an important factor” (Drake and Weyman-Jones, 1992, p. 5). 
Accordingly, the number of branches are closely related to the level of financial intermediation 
provided - a negative coefficient is inferred. The second hypothesis is that the number of branches 
and agencies are a critical, and possibly negative factor, in the ability of head offices to promote 
efficient behaviour. In this case, we would expect a positive coefficient, ceteris paribus.7 The next 
variable is a time trend to identify the general direction of changes in efficiency/inefficiency over 
the period in question. The coefficient would necessarily depend on the relative impact of 
technological change over the period, and the impact of institutional and structural considerations, 
amongst other factors. No a priori coefficient is postulated. Finally, the extent of non-core lending 
activity is proxied by the level of commercial loan activity. One hypothesis here is that exposure to 
non-core loan activity may serve to “impose market discipline” (Mester, 1993, p. 282) on building 
society managers - thus a negative coefficient is hypothesised. Alternatively, existing concerns on 
 
6 In the interests of correctly estimating the input prices associated with deposits, it would be preferable to make the 
distinction between wholesale and retail funds. Unfortunately, the data set obtained does not include this level of detail. 
7 A further view exists that “...building society branching should be regarded as an output jointly supplied with 
accounts...more branches improve the accessibility of building society services” (Hardwick, 1990, p. 451).  
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Total cost (000s) $10,479  $14,543  $54  $66,788  
Personal loans (000s) $7,647  $15,602  $0  $65,094  
Property loans (000s) $380,352 $564,095 $1,279  $2,572,769  
Commercial loan (000s) $16,155  $32,969  $0  $148,390  
Other securities (000s) $79,914  $98,498  $1,562  $440,929  
Price of physical capital 1.379 4.259 0.104 20.220 
Price of deposits 0.016 0.003 0.012 0.026 
Price of labour (000s) $9.224  $5.211  $4.995  $2.309  
Assets (000s) $493,155 $674,189 $2,849  $3,034,810  
Capital 0.069 0.023 0.041 0.139 
Branches (n) 21 26 1 110 
Agencies (n) 46 76 0 352 
Commercial loans 0.048 0.059 0.000 0.196 
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the impact of this apparently speculative lending may be justified - a positive coefficient is inferred. 
The ex ante sign would therefore depend on one’s perception of the relative strengths of these 
factors. 
IV. RESULTS 
The maximum-likelihood estimates for the parameters of the normalised translog cost frontier 
detailed in (5) are presented in Table 3. Asymptotic standard errors and levels of significance are 
also presented. Overall, the translog cost function has performed well. The null hypothesis of the 
joint insignificance of the cost function coefficients (β0 = β1...= β27 = 0) is rejected using the log-
likelihood ratio statistic found in Battese and Coelli (1993) with chi squared distribution (χ272 = 
40.113, χSTAT = 48.23, α = 0.05) as is the null that the nested Cobb-Douglas cost function would 
have been appropriate (β5 = β6...= β14 = β17...= β27 = 0) (χ202 = 31.41, χSTAT = 48.23, α = 0.05). 
TABLE 3. Maximum-likelihood estimates 
Parameter Variable Coefficient Std. Error Parameter Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
β0 CONST -3.2429*** 1.1233 β18 lnP2P2 -
0.1070*** 
0.0089 
β1 lnQ1 0.1597*** 0.0397 β19 lnP1P2 0.0040 0.0134 
β2 lnQ2 0.0245 0.6204 β20 lnQ1P1 0.0074*** 0.0018 
β3 lnQ3 -0.0397 0.0292 β21 lnQ1P2 -0.0015 0.0017 
β4 lnQ4 -0.1002 0.6961 β22 lnQ2P1 -
0.0444*** 
0.0151 
β5 lnQ1Q1 0.0015* 0.0009 β23 lnQ2P2 0.0052 0.0146 
β6 lnQ2Q2 -0.1163** 0.0525 β24 lnQ3P1 -0.0030** 0.0014 
β7 lnQ3Q3 0.0002 0.0010 β25 lnQ3P2 0.0027** 0.0013 
β8 lnQ4Q4 -0.1333** 0.0647 β26 lnQ4P1 0.0288* 0.0159 
β9 lnQ1Q2 0.0119** 0.0050 β27 lnQ4P2 -
0.0454*** 
0.0161 
β10 lnQ1Q3 -0.0003 0.0004 σ2 Sigma 
squared
0.3285*** 0.0308 
β11 lnQ1Q4 -0.0192*** 0.0054 γ Gamma 0.4857*** 0.0143 
β12 lnQ2Q3 -0.0026 0.0050 δ1 Z1 -0.2E-8*** 0.32E-9 
β13 lnQ2Q4 0.2609** 0.1106 δ2 Z2 -1.4103 1.0640 
β14 lnQ3Q4 0.0057 0.0054 δ3 Z3 0.0178*** 0.0063 
β15 lnP1 0.1371 0.2173 δ4 Z4 -
0.0015*** 
0.0004 
β16 lnP2 -1.1312*** 0.1976 δ5 Z5 -
0.1001*** 
0.0172 
β17 lnP1P1 -0.0133*** 0.0026 δ6 Z6 4.7616*** 1.0850 
Asterisk(s) denote significance: *, **, *** at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Log-likelihood: 57.884
However, the interpretation of the estimate of γ indicates that much work remains to be done in 
accounting for the inefficiency effects (δi). For the model specification used in this study, it may be 
interpreted as an indication of the amount of unexplained variation in the cost inefficiency effects, 
relative to the sum of this value and the variance of Vit (Coelli, 1995, p. 19). To this end, the 
explanatory variables employed only account for some fifty-two percent of the variation in 
inefficiency. The inclusion of institutional dummies to account for manifest state-based regulation 
would certainly go some way towards remedying this deficiency. However, and as noted by Esho 
and Sharpe (1996, p. 257), “future research should [also] aim at developing better proxies for risk 
and service quality and potential measures of organisational structure and managerial ability”. 
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Sample inefficiency scores using the calculations (3) are presented in Table 4. In terms of building 
society efficiency, the stochastic cost function technique employed produces efficiency scores 
ranging from unity to infinity; in economic terms the inefficiency scores indicate how far above the 
cost function the building society is operating. As shown in Table 4, the mean inefficiency score 
varied in four sample quarters from 0.019  to 0.50  (cost inefficiencies of 1.9 to 50.0 percent); the 
overall mean inefficiency for the entire sample being 0.212 - suggesting that the typical building 
society produces its products at a cost that is approximately 21.2 percent greater than necessary 
during the period in question. The scores during the entire thirteen quarters ranged from 0.000 to 
0.610 indicating a wide variety of inefficiency in the building society sample. However, there does 
appear to be some consistency in ranking, as shown in Table 4. In particular, trends exist in 
efficiency ratings, more than likely the result of fixed managerial inputs. Moreover, there has been a 
general improvement in both the average level of efficiency, and the level of dispersion of 
efficiency, during the period in question. Whilst these results are consistent with those of 
Cebenoyan et al. (1993), Mester (1993), Esho and Sharpe (1996) and others in the analysis of non-
bank financial institution efficiency, variance in samples and estimation techniques precludes valid 
comparison. 
TABLE 4. Sample cost inefficiencies 
Institution June 1993 June 1994 June 1995 Institution June 1993 June 1994 June 1995 
1 0.019 0.343 0.178 14 0.346 0.083 0.063 
2 0.323 0.271 0.125 15 0.096 0.304 0.124 
3 0.420 0.417 0.364 16 0.139 0.062 0.042 
4 0.496 0.179 0.057 17 0.116 0.069 0.070 
5 0.382 0.134 0.228 18 0.281 0.090 0.110 
6 0.271 0.076 0.187 19 0.064 0.269 0.045 
7 0.120 0.216 0.070 20 0.140 0.123 0.380 
8 0.478 0.500 0.052 21 0.049 0.071 0.030 
9 0.316 0.110 0.110 22 0.450 0.346 0.150 
10 0.135 0.176 0.032 Mean 0.239 0.204 0.120 
11 0.430 0.459 0.123 Std. Dev 0.158 0.139 0.098 
12 0.126 0.049 0.022 Minimum 0.019 0.049 0.022 
13 0.068 0.150 0.073 Maximum 0.496 0.500 0.380 
Following Battese and Coelli (1993) the relationship between firm inefficiency and building society 
organisational form is also evaluated in Table 3. The signs of all six coefficients conform to their a 
priori coefficients, with only the coefficient on capital being insignificant. The null hypothesis that 
the inefficiency effects are absent from the model (H0: γ=δ1=δ2=δ3=δ4=δ5=δ6=0) is rejected using 
the generalised likelihood-ratio test statistic with chi-square distribution. Likewise, the null 
hypothesis that the inefficiency is not a linear function of the explanatory effects (H0: 
δ1=δ2=δ3=δ4=δ5=δ6=0) is also rejected. 
A number of points can be made. First, it would appear that branch and/or agency networks have a 
dramatic impact on overall building society efficiency. In the case of extensive branch networks the 
ability of central offices to promote cost efficiency is mitigated, whilst the reverse would seem to 
hold for building societies which rely on agencies. The results contrast sharply with Cebenoyan et 
al. (1993) who found the coefficient associated with the number of branches/agencies to be 
insignificant. Second, the negative coefficient of the time variable suggests that the cost efficiency 
of Australian building societies over the sample period has improved. Associated with this 
observation, one may recognise the possible influences of technological advances, as well as the 
changing institutional and competitive structure of the industry. Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992, p. 
6) rationalise similar findings in the UK scenario “as an indication that the intensification of 
competition...and the associated increase in merger activity has resulted in a marked improvement 
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in the overall level of efficiency within the building society industry”. Conversely, in a study of pre- 
and post-deregulation Australian building societies, Esho and Sharpe (1996, p. 258) fail to support 
the proposition that deregulation provided “...a competitive stimulus for [permanent building 
societies] to improve their operating efficiency”. 
Third, in terms of assets, larger organisations appear to have an advantage in managing institutional 
operations. This conflicts with Cebenoyan et al. (1993, p. 164) where “inefficiency differences 
across [non-bank financial institutions] does not appear to be related to firm size”. This finding is 
offset somewhat by the negative impact of branches - a condition most likely to be found in firms 
with larger assets. Fourth, the sign of coefficient on capital accords with the “moral hazard” view of 
firm behaviour, though it is insignificant. As detailed by Mester (1993, p. 283) in the case of US 
thrifts, higher levels of capitalisation are associated with higher levels of efficiency. Finally, the 
coefficient for commercial loans suggests that the positive impact of the market discipline imposed 
by non-core assets for efficiency is subverted to the speculative risk associated with such assets, as 
against the results of Mester (1993). In terms of a study incorporating comparable methodology and 
data, the results contrast sharply with Esho and Sharpe (1996, p. 257), who found that “...attempts 
to examine the determinants of [permanent building society] X-efficiency proved largely 
unsuccessful”. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present study uses a stochastic cost frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of Australian 
building societies during the period 1992 to 1995.  The current paper extends existing empirical 
work in this area in three ways. First, it incorporates pooled time-series, cross-sectional data; 
permitting consistent estimators of firm efficiency, across both firms and time. Second, the study 
evaluates non-bank financial institution efficiency in an Australian context, complementing  the 
existing US and UK institutional focus. Finally, the present paper incorporates a model for the 
single-stage estimation of inefficiency effects. The evidence provided suggests that, on average, 
Australian building societies operated at a high level of cost efficiency during the period in 
question. Moreover, it would appear that the overall level of efficiency has improved over time. 
With the incorporation of efficiency effects, the paper also sheds some light on the relationships 
between financial institution efficiency and organisational structure. In this respect, the evidence 
suggests that branch and agency networks, institutional size, and non-core commercial activities 
have a significant influence on efficient outcomes, though the level of capital (and by insinuation, 
capital adequacy regulation) does not. 
There are at least three ways in which this research may be extended. First, it would be useful to 
derive more appropriate proxies for organisational structure and managerial ability as an attempt to 
account for the sources of financial institution inefficiency. However, a more fundamental 
limitation of existing studies would appear to be the failure to address (and correctly model) the 
institutional structure produced by regulation. A second extension would be to use nonparametric 
techniques, such as data envelopment analysis, to analyse non-bank financial institution efficiency. 
It may be that the imposition of a specific structural form, as is the case with a stochastic frontier, 
may not be entirely appropriate. Finally, similar techniques to the present study could be extended 
to alternative conceptualisations of financial institution behaviour. More particularly, where 
accurate data on account transactions and individual deposit characteristics could be obtained, a 
production approach may provide alternative criteria for assessing efficiency. The latter point 
highlights the necessity for accurate and consistent data being made available for research into non-
bank financial institution efficiency. 
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